Emery v. Emery by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
10-28-1955
Emery v. Emery
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Emery v. Emery 45 Cal.2d 421 (1955).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/388
) 
Oct. 1955] E:r.mRY v. EMERY 
[45 C.2d 421; 289 P.2d 218] 
421 
[So F. No. 19339. In Bank. Oct. 28, 1955.] 
BARBARA EMEHY, a Minor., etc., et al., Appellants, v. 
BUEL E. EMERY et al., Respondents. 
[1] Automobiles-L.:.w Governing.-Whether a complaint states a 
cause of action for injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent in Idaho is governed by Idaho law. 
[2] Id.-Pleading-Reck.1ess Disregard of Rights of Others.-If a 
complaint states causes of action for "wilful misconduct" 
within the meaning of the California guest statute (Veh. Code, 
§ 403), it also states causes of action for conduct in "reckless 
disregard of the rights of others" within the meaning of the 
Idaho guest statute (Idaho Code, § 49-1001). 
[8] Negligence-Wilful Misconduct.-Wilful misconduct depends 
on the facts of a particular case and necessarily involves de-
liberate, intentional or wanton conduct in doing or omitting 
to perform acts, with knowledge or appreciation of the fact, 
on the part of the culpable person, that danger is likely to 
result therefrom. 
[4] Id.-Wilful Misconduct.-Wilful misconduct implies at least 
the intentional doing of something either with a knowledge 
that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a 
possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a 
wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result. 
[5] Automobiles - Pleading - Wilful Misconduct.-A complaint 
by minor children against their father and minor brother for 
injuries sustained in an automobile accident sufficiently alleges 
wilful misconduct on the part of the father and brother where 
it is alleged that the brother was an unskilled driver, that 
immediately before the accident he was "sleepy and drowsy" 
and had not had any sleep for more than 24 hours, that for 
a long period of time and many miles of travel before the 
accident he drove at high and excessive rates of speed on a 
road that was narrow and unfamiliar to him, that the fore-
going facts were known to the father, that the brother drove 
under these circumstances with the consent and under the 
direction of the father, and that the brother fell asleep "while 
said car was traveling at said high and excessive rates of 
speed, and lost control thereof, causing said car to roll over." 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 8 j Am. Jur., Negligence, § 48. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 174a; [2, 5] Auto-
mobiles, §180a; [3,4] Negligence, §8j [6,7] Conflict of taws, 
§ 13 j [8-11, 19] Parent and Child, § 3; [12, 13, 15, 17] Infants, 
. § 4; [14] Automobiles, §§ 123(3), 123(4); [16] Parent and Child, 
§ 2; [IS] Husband and Wife, § 65(1). 
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[6] Conflicts of Laws - '.r.orts.-In an action by minor children 
against their father and minor brother for injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident in Idaho, the question whether the 
father and brother are immune from liability to plaintiffs, 
is one of capacity to sue and be sued, and as to that question 
• the place of injury is both fortuitous and irrelevant. 
[7] Id.-Torts.-Disabilities to sue and immunities from suit be-
cause of a family relationship are more properly determined 
by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile, 
since that state has the primary responsibility for establishing 
and regulating the incidents of the family relationship, and 
since it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities and 
immunities conferred or imposed by such relationship should 
constantly change as members of the family cross state bound-
aries during temporary absences from home. 
[8] Parent and Child-Parental Immunity From Tort Liability.-
The modern trend of decisions is to mitigate the rule of abso-
lute immunity from responsibility of a parent for wilful and 
malicious torts to his minor child. 
[9] Id.-Parental Immunity From Tort Liability.-Preservation 
of the parent's right to discipline his minor children has been 
the basic policy behind the rule of parental immunity from 
tort liability. 
[10] Id.-Parental Immunity From Tort Liability.-Since the law 
imposes on the parent a duty to rear and discipline his child 
and confers the right to prescribe a course of reasonable con-
duct for its development, the parent has a wide discretion 
in the performance of his parental functions, but that discre-
tion does not include the right wilfully to inflict personal in-
juries beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline, and 
no sound public policy would be subserved by extending it 
beyond those limits. 
[11] Id.-Actions by Child Against Parent.-A child, like every 
other individual, has a right to freedom from wilful or 
malicious misconduct, and hence may sue his parent for a 
wilful or malicious tort. 
[12] Infants - Liability for Torts. - Exceptions to the general 
principle of liability of minors for their torts (Civ. Code, 
§ 41) arc not to be lightly created, and no exception to lia-
bility of a minor brother for torts to his minor sisters should 
be allowed on the speculative assumption that to do so would 
preserve the family. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d. Conflict of Laws, § 79 et seq.; Am.Jur., Con-
flict of Laws, § 180 et seq. 
[11] See Cal.Jur., Parent aud Child, § 6; Am.Jur., Parent and 
Child, §§ 48, 88 et 8eq. 
... 
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[13] Id. - Liability for Torts.-The mere possibility that tort 
actions between minor brothers and sisters will encourage 
fraud and collusion because ~f the possible existence of lia-
bility insurance does not warrant immunity from liability 
where it would otherwise exist, and the interest of the 
child in freedom from personal injury caused by the tortious 
conduct of others is sufficient to outweigh any danger of 
fraud or collusion. 
[14] Automobiles-Oare as to Guests - Intoxication and Wilful 
Misconduct.-The guest statute (Veh. Code, § 403), which 
was enacted to protect owners and operators of vehicles from 
fraudulent claims of those riding as guests, grants the owner 
or operator of a vehicle absolute immunity from liability for 
injuries proximately resulting from negligence in operation 
of the vehicle, and since the Legislature considered that the 
immunity thus granted was sufficient to protect the ownel' 
and operator from fraudulent claims, it is improper for the 
Supreme Court to extend that immunity further in a particu-
lar class of cases to claims for injuries proximately resulting 
from the operator's wilful misconduct or intoxication. 
[15] Infants-Liability for Torts.-Tort actions between minor 
brothers and sisters will not impair their parents' exercise 
of their disciplinary functions. 
[16] Parent and Ohild-Liability of Parent for Torts of Ohild.-
A parent is not ordinarily vicariously liable fer the torts of 
his minor child, and a minor child's property is his own and 
not that of his parents. (Civ. Code, § 203.) 
[17] Infants-Liability for Torts.-The possibility of a minor de-
fendant's succession by intestacy to the damages recovered 
from him by a minor brother or sister is too remote and 
speCUlative as a basis on which to found the rule of im-
munity from suit by one against the other. 
[18] Husband and Wife-Oommunity Propsrty-Damages for Per-
sonal Injuries.-In action by mother of minor children against 
their father and minor brother for medical and other expenses 
incurred as the result of an automobile accident, the pleading 
against her husband is defective since a cause of action for 
damages suffered by the parents because of injury to their 
minor children is community property, and the husband's 
alleged wilful misconduct is imputable to her. 
[19] Parent and Ohild-Plcading.-In action by mother of minor 
children against their father and minor brother for medical 
and other expenses incurred as the result of an automobile 
accident, the pleading against her minor son is defective where 
it fails to comply with the requirements of Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 376, relating to actions by parents of child for injuriea 
and to nonjoinder of one parent as plainti1L 
) 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Herbert C. Kaufman, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained as a 
result of an automobile accident. Judgment for defendants 
reversed. 
J. Oscar Goldstein, P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein, 
Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein and Robert J. Cort for 
Appellants. 
Worthington, Park & Worthington and Ronsia W. Fields 
for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs Barbara and Joyce Emery, un-
emancipated minor daughters of plaintiff Esther Emery and 
defendant Buel Emery, brought this action to recover for 
personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident that 
occurred in the State of Idaho. At the time of the accident, 
Barbara and Joyce were riding as guests in an automobile 
owned by Buel and driven by defendant James Emery, their 
unemancipated minor brother. Esther, appearing indivi-
dually, alleges that she is responsible for the support, main-
tenance, and medical care of Barbara and Joyce and attempts 
to state a separate cause of action to recover for medical, 
nursing, hospital, and other care furnished Barbara and 
Joyce. Judgment for defendants was entered on an order 
sustaining, without leave to amend, defendants' general de-
murrer to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Plaintiffs 
appeal. 
The first question presented on appeal is whether Barbara 
and Joyce have alleged facts l sufficient to constitute causes 
'The relevant paragraphs of the complaint are as follows: 
"VII 
"That on or about the 18th day of June, 1952, at approximatel,. 
9 :30 A. M., on said public highway 99, about twenty-eight miles west 
of Idaho Falls, in the State of Idaho, the Plaintiff was riding as a 
guest in a certain 1939 Pontiac Automobile, California license plate, 
being driven, operated and maintained by the Defendant, JAMES BUEL 
EMERY as the agent, servant and employee of the Defendant BUEL E. 
EMERY, that the said BUEL E. EMERY is the legal registered OMler of 
said 1939 Pontiac automobile, California license plate. 
"VIII 
"That at all times herein mentioned defendant JAMES BUZL EMERY 
was a minor of the age of seventeen (17) yenrs; thnt at time and place 
bereinafter and her~J.)e!ore mentioned; said uWl.Ol' WtfeJldant J.uo:a 
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of action against defendants, assuming that the latter are not 
immune from suit because of their family relationship to these 
plaintiffs. [1] Since the accident occurred in the State of 
Idaho, the law of that state is determinative of the answer 
to this question. (Grant v. illcAuHffe, 41 Ca1.2d 859, 862 
[264 P.2d 944] ; Lomnger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366-367 
[10 P.2d 63, 84 A.IJ.R. 1264].) The applicable Idaho statute 
provides, "No person transported by the owner or operator 
of a motor vehicle as his guest without paying for such trans-
portation shall have a cause of action for damages against 
such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in case of 
accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional 
BUEL EMERY had only been driving for a short period of time and was 
an unskilled and inexperienced driver and unaccustomed to driving during 
the times, in the places and under the circumstances hereinbefore and 
hereinafter mentioned; all of which facts were known to the Defendant 
BUEL E. EMERY. 
"IX 
"That at said time, place and direction, as aforesaid the Defendants 
JAMES B. EMERY and BUEL E. EMERY were guilty of wilful misconduct; 
that said wilful misconduct consisted of the following acts under the 
following existing circumstances: That Defendant BUEL E. EMERY, the 
father of the minor Defendant JAMES B. EMERY, directed the said minor 
Defendant JAMES B. EMERY to drive that certain 1939 Pontiac automo-
bile, California license plate, knowing that the said Defendant JAMES B. 
EMERY was sleepy and drowsy and had not had any sleep for a long 
period of time in excess of twenty-four hours; that the said Defendant 
JAMES B. EMERY did for many miles and for a long period of time prior 
to and during said accident, drive at high and excessive rates of speed, 
with the knowledge and consent of his father, the said Defendant BUEL E. 
EMERY; that the said defendant BUEL E. EMERY, the father of the 
minor defendant JAMES BUEL EMERY, directed the said minor defendant 
JAMES BUEL EMERY to drive that certain 1939 Pontiac automobile, Cali-
fornia license plate, knowing that the said minor Defendant JAMES BUEL 
EMERY was an unskilled driver and unaccustomed to driving during the 
times, in the places and under the circumstances hereinbefore and here-
inafter mentioned: that said Defendant BUEL E. EMERY knew that the 
said road was in a dangerous condition in that said road had dirt and 
gravel on either side and was only a 2-1ane highway; that while the 
minor Defendant JAMES BUEL EMERY was so operating said aforemen-
tioned automobile, said minor Defendant JAMES BUEL EMERY fell asleep 
at the wheel of said car while said car was travelling at said high and 
excessive rates of speed, and lost control thereof, causing said car to 
roll over; that all of the aforementioned wilful misconduct of the defend-
ants took place with a complete disregard of and indifference to the 
great possibility of injuring the persons riding in the car tllat defendants 
were operating, including the plaintiff herein, and with full knowledge 
of the dangers involved; and that as a direct and proximate result of 
said wilful misconduct on the part of the defendants as aforementio:tJ.eJ 
the said 1939 Pontiac automobile, California license plates, did at the 
aforementioned time and place and direction leave the highway and roll 
over as aforementioned, causing the plaintiff to sustain severe. serious 
aud permanent injuries &13 hereinafter set forth." 
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on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his intoxi-
cation or his reckless disregard of the rights of others." 
(Idaho Code, § 49-1001.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the term "reck-
less disregard" ill that statute as u('scribing conduct that is 
110t necessarily as culpable as that described by the words 
"wilful misconduct" as us('d in section 403 of the California 
Vehicle Code.2 (Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461 [253 P.2d 
240, 2431 ; Hughes v. Hudelson, 67 Idaho 10 l169 P.2d 712, 
716].) [2] A fortiori, if the complaint states causes of 
action for "wilful misconduct" within the meaning of the 
California statute it also states causes of action for conduct 
in "reckless uisregard of the rights of others" within the 
meaning of the Idaho statute. 
[3] "'Wilful misconduct uepends upon the facts of a par-
ticular case and necessarily involves deliberate, intentional 
or wanton conduct in uoing or om itting to perform acts, with 
knowledge or appr('ciation of the fact, on the part of the 
culpable persoll, that danger is likely to result therefrom. 
[Citations.] " (Norton v. Puter, 138 Cal.App. 253, 258 [32 
P.2d 172], quoted with approval in Parsons v. Fuller, 8 Cal. 
2d 463, 468 [66 P.2d 430].) [4] "'Wilful misconduct 
implies at least the intentional doing of something either with 
a knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished 
from a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act 
with a wanton and reckless disr('gard of its poss'ible result.' " 
(Meek v. Fowler, 3 Ca1.2d 420, 426 [45 P.2d 194], quoted 
with approval in Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
40 Ca1.2d 102, 118 (251 P.2d 955].) In Parsons v. Fuller, 
supra, it was held that the evidence, which showed that the 
defendant had "persisted" in driving at an excessive rate 
of speeu "for some hours and over many miles of travel, 
after repeated protests on the part of his guest, and while 
travelling over a mountaiu road with frequent curves ... ," 
was sufficient to show wilful misconduct. (8 Ca1.2d at 465.) 
In that case the court said, " 'To us it seems clear that one 
who, while driving an automobile, knowingly flirts with 
." No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a high-
way without giving compensation for ::Iuch ride, nor any other person, 
has any right of action for civil damages a~:.l.inst the driver of such 
vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of such 
driver on account of personal injury to or the death of such guest during 
such ride, unless the plaintiff in nlly such nction c:::talilishcs that such 
injury or death proximately resulted from the iutol'ication or wilful 
misconduct of liuch driver." 
) 
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danger and, without nt>cC'l';sity or emergency compelling him, 
"takes a chance" on killing or injuring himself or others, 
who may be so unfortunate as t9 be riding with him, is guilty 
of wilful misconduct.'" (Ibid., at 468-469.) [5] In the pres-
ent case it is alleged in the complaint (sec footnote 1, supra) 
that James was an unskilled driver, that immediately before 
the accident he was "sleepy and drowsy" and had not had any 
sleep for more than 24 hours, that for a long period of time 
and many miles of travel before the accident he drove at 
high and excessive rates of speed on a road that was narrow 
and unfamiliar to him, that the foregoing facts were known 
to Buel, that James drove under these circumstances with 
the consent and under the direction of Buel, that James feU 
asleep "while said car was travelling at said high and ex-
cessive rates of speed, and lost control thereof, causing said 
car to roll over .... " Applying the foregoing principles, 
we conclude that the complaint adequately alleges wilful 
misconduct on the part of James and Bue) and thus that 
the minor plaintiffs have stated causes of action against 
defendants, assuming that the latter are not immune from suit 
because of their family relationship to the minor plaintiffs. 
[6] To determine whether Buel and James are immune 
from liability to Barbara and Joyce for tIle torts alleged 
in the complaint, it is first necessary to decide whether that 
question should be determined by the law of California or 
that of Idaho. This choice of law problem is one of first 
impression in this state. The possible choices in cases like 
the present one are three: the law of the place where the 
injury occurred, the law of the forum, and the law of the 
state in which the family is domiciled. We are aware of 
only two reported cases on the precise question presented. 
In Ball v. Ball. -- 'Vyo. -- [269 P.2d302, 304], the 
Supreme Court of \Vyoming applied the law of the place 
(Montana) where the injury occurred to determine this ques-
tion. It is not, however, a question of tort hut one of capacity 
to sue and be sued8 and as to that question the place of injury 
is both fortuitous and irrelevant. In Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vae, 
52 Ga.App. 338, 340 [183 S.E. 210], the Court of Appeals 
of Georgia held that in actions between a minor child and 
its parent the "law of the forum governs as to the parties 
<. 
8The parent's immunity, if any, from tort liability is based on the 
minor child's disability to sue rather than on the absence of a violated 
duty. (See Worrel; v. Wo<rrell, 174 Va. 11, 23, 27 f4 S.E.2d 342]. 
Dun14p v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 372 [150 A. UOJ, 71 A.L.R. 1055].) 
) 
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and the right to sue." In a somewhat analogous situation, 
many courts have held in tort actions between husbands and 
wives that questbns of capacity to sue and be sued should 
be governed by the law of the forum. (See Ford, InterspousaZ 
J,iqbility for A.utomobile Accidents in the Oonflict of Laws, 
15 U.Pitts.L.Rev. 397, 419, and cases cited.) It should 
be noted, however, that in many of these cases, as in Fowlkes 
v. Ray-O-Vae, supra, the state of the forum was also the state 
of the domicile. Although tort actions between members 
of the same family will ordinarily be brought in the state 
of the family domicile, the courts of another state will 
in some cases be a more convenient forum.< and thus the 
question arises whether the choice of law rule should be 
expressed in terms of the law of the forum or that of the 
domicile. [7] ''IV e think that disabilities to sue and immu-
nities from suit because of a family relationship are more 
properly determined by reference to the law of the state 
of the family domicile. That state has the primary respon-
sibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the 
family relationship and it is the only state in which the 
parties can, by participation in the legislative processes, 
effect a chauge in those incidents. Moreover, it is unde-
sirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities 
conferred or imposed by the family relationship should con-
stantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries 
during temporary absences from their home. Since all of 
the parties to the present case are apparently domiciliaries 
of California, we must look to the law of this state to deter-
mine whether any disabilities or immunities exist. 
Defendants contend that Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 
678 [300 P. 7], and Myers v. Tranquillity 1rr. Dist., 26 Cal. 
App.2d 385 [79 P.2d 419], are controlling on the question 
of Bnc! 's immunity to suit by his unemancipated minor daugh-
ters, Barbara and Joyce. In Trudell v. Leatherby it was 
stated that a " 'minor child has no right of action against 
a parent for the tort of the latter'" (212 Cal. at 680), but 
plaintiff points out that both Trudell v. Leatherby and Myers 
v. Tranquillity Irr. Dist. illvolved actions for injuries caused 
by the parent's negligence, whereas in the present case Bar-
bara and Joyce state causes of action for wilful misconduct. 
To sustain their contentioll, plaintiffs cite a number of cases 
from other jurisdictions holding that, although a parent is 
not responsible to his minor child for negligence. he is re-
sponsible for wilful and malicious torts. (Wright v. Wright, 
Oct. 1D55] EMERY t'. EMEnY 
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85 Ga.App. 721 [70 S.E.2d 152, 155-156] [wilful misconduct] ; 
Treschman v. Trescliman, 28 Iud.App. 206, 210-212 [61 N.E. 
961] [assault and battery] j gi!mbab v. Siembab. 202 l\Iisc. 
1053, 1056 L112 N.Y.S.2d 82] [wilful misconduct] j Meyer v. 
Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 554 [92 N.Y.S.2d 595] [wilful mis-
conduct], aff'd 276 App.Div. 972 [94 N.Y.S.2d 620] ; Mahnke 
v. MOO1'e, 197 Md. 61, 68 [77 A.2d 923] [intentional mental 
cruelty] j Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo.App. 266, 274 [157 S.\V. 
133] [assault] j Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Orf'. 282, 293-301 [218 
P.2d 445] [wilful misconduct] j see also Cannon v. Cannon, 
287 N.Y. 425, 429 [40 N.E.2d 236]; Baker v. Baker, 364 
Mo. 453 [263 S.'V.2d 29, 30-31] j Levesque v. Levesque, 
99 N.H. 147 [106 A.2d 563, 564]; Matarese v. Matarese, 
47 R.I. 131, 134 [131 A.198, 42 A.L.R. 1360] j .t1boussie v. 
Abollssie, (Tex.Civ.App.) 270 S.W.2d 636, 639; Brumfield 
v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 583 [74 S.E. 170] j Securo v. 
Securo, 110 Vl.Va. 1, 2 [156 S.E. 750].) 
[8] Although thf're are no California cases involving an 
action by a minor child against its parent for a wilful or 
malicious tort, the modern trend of decisions (see anno. 19 
A.L.R.2d 423, 427 and cases cited; Prosser on Torts [2d ed.] 
675-677; Davis v. Smith (E.D.Pa.), 126 F.Supp. 497, 502-506 
and cases cited; Dunla.p v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 [150 A. 905] j 
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn.2d 642, 647-654 l251 P.2d 149] and 
cases cited; 29 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1302; 39 Va.L.Rev. 389) is 
to mitigate the rule of absolute immunity established by the 
early cases of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703 [9 So. 885, 
13 L.R.A. 682] [false imprisonment of minor child in an 
insane asylum], and Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 [79 P. 788, 
107 Am.St.Rep. 805, 3 Ann. Cas. 1, 68 L.R.A. 893] [rape of 
a minor child by her father]. The rationale of the cases 
refusing to extend immunity to the parent for wilful or 
malicious torts against his minor children is that the lack 
of such immunity does not conflict with or inhibit reasonable 
parental discipline. (See Cowgill v. Boock. supra., 189 Ore. 
282, 293, 297-298; Borst v. Borst, supra, 41 vVn.2d 642, 656; 
McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations," 
43 Harv.L.Rev. 1030, 1079; 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1208.) 
[9] Preservation of the parent's right to discipline his 
minor children has been the basic policy behind the rule 
of parental immunity from tort liability. (Sf'e McCvrdy, 
s'upm, 43 Harv.L.Rev. ]030, 1076-1077.) [10] Since th(> 
law impos(>s on the parcnt a (luty to rear and discipline his 
child and eonfel's the right to prescribe a course of reaSOll-
) 
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able conduct for its development, the parent has a wide dis-
cretion in the performance of his parental functions, but that 
discretion does not include the right wilfully to inflict personal 
injuries beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline. 
No sound public policy would be subserved by extending 
it· beyond those limits. \Vhile it may seem repugnant to 
allow a minor to sue his parent, we think it more repugnant 
to leave a minor child without redress for the damage he 
has suffered by reason of his parent's wilful or malicious 
misconduct. [11] A child, like every other individual, has 
a right to freedom from such injury. Accordingly, we 
conclude that an unemancipated minor may sue his parent 
for a wilful or malicious tort, and thus that Buel is not 
immune from suit for the ('a uses of action pleaded by Barbara 
and Joyce in the complaint in the present action. 
In support of their contention that .1 ames is not immune 
from suit, plaintiffs Barbara and Joyce cite Rozell v. Rozell, 
281 N.Y. 106 [22 N.E.2d 254. 123 A.L.R. 1015], in which 
the New York Court of Appeals held that an action was 
maintainable by a 12-year-old boy ag-ainst his I6-year-old 
sister for injuries sustained while riding in an automobile 
negligently operated by her. (See also Munsert v. Farmers 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 ·Wis. 581. 586 [281 N.W. 671]; 
Beilke v. Knaack, 207 \Vis. 490, 493-494 [242 N.W. 176J.) 
Although defendants concede that the few reported cases 
involving this question all support plaintiffs' contention that 
actions between minor brothers and sisters are maintainable, 
they nevertheless argue that those eases are unsound and 
should not be followed by this court. They contend that 
to allow tort actions to be maintained between minor brothers 
and sisters will (1) disrupt the family harmony, (2) en-
courage fraud and collusion, (3) impair the parents' exercise 
of their disciplinary functions, (4) result in an uneven dis-
tribution of the family resources, and (5) encourage useless 
litigation since there is a possibility that the minor defendant 
will live to inherit the mOlley recovered from him by 
the minor plaintiff. These arguments are not persuasive. 
[12] Exceptions to the general principle of liability (Civ. 
Code, § 3523 [" For every wrong there is a remedy.' '] ) 
of minors for their torts (Civ. Code, § 41 ; Ellis v. D'Angelo, 
116 Ca1.App.2d 310. 313-315 [253 P.2U 675J) are not to be 
lightly created, and we ucclille to create such an exception 
on the basis of the speculative assumption that to do so would 
preserve family harmony. An uncompensated tort is no 
) 
) 
) 
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more apt to promote or preserve peace in the family than 
is an action between minor brother and sister to recover 
damages for that tort. Furthermore, the relationship be-
tween brother and sister is not complicated by reciprocal 
rights and obligations of the kind that characterize the rela-
tionships of husband and wife and parent and child and that 
lend some support to the immunities from tort liability that 
ha ve been recognized in such cases. 
[13] Defendants' second argument, that tort actions be-
tween minor brothers and sisters will encourage fraud and 
collusion, is based on assumptions opposite from those on 
which their first argument is based. This argument assumes 
that the action is not in reality directQd against the minor 
brother or sister of the plaintiff, but is in fact directed at 
his liability insurer. If this assumption is correct, mainte-
nance of such a tort action would not disturb the family peace 
and harmony; on the contrary, the "domestic harmony will 
not be disrupted so much by allowing the action as by de-
nying it." (Prosser on Torts [2d ed.] 677.) Moreover, al-
though defendants' statement that the existence of insurance, 
of which there is no evidence in the present case, "gives no 
cause of action where one did not exist before" is correct, 
by the same token the mere possibility of fraud or collusion 
because of the possible existence of liability insurance does 
not warrant immunity from liability where it would other-
wise exist. The interest of the child in freedom from per-
sonal injury caused by the tortious conduct of others is 
sufficient to outweigh any danger of fraud or collusion. 
As the Supreme Court of Washington said in reply to 
the same argument in a case involving an analogous situ a-
ation [action by a child to recover for injuries caused by 
its parent's negligent operation of a truck for business pur-
poses], "The courts may and should take cognizance of fraud 
and collusion when found to exist in a particular case. 
However, the fact that there may be greater opportunity 
for fraud or collusion in one class of cases than another 
does not warrant courts of law in closing the door to all 
cases of that class. Courts must depend upon the efficacy 
of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from 
the fraudulent in particular cases. Rozell v. Rozell, supra. 
If those processes prove inadequate, the problem becoines 
one for the Legislature. See Signs v. ~~igns, supra [156 
Ohio St. 566 (103 N.E.2<.l 743)]. Courts will not immunize 
tortfeasors from liability in a whole class of cases because 
) 
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of the possibility of fraud, but will depend upon the Legis-
lature to deal with the problem as a question of public 
policy." (BoTst v. Borst, supra, 41 \Vn.2d 642, 653-654.) 
[14] In California, the Legislature has dealt with the prob-
leIQ.. Our guest statute (Veh. Code, § 403), which was 
enacted to protcct owners and operators of vehicles from 
fraudulent claims of those riding as guests (lVeber v. Pinyan, 
9 Ca1.2d 226, 229 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407]), grants the 
owner and operator of a vellicle absolute immunity from 
liability for injuries proximately resulting from negligence 
in the opcration of the vehicle. Since the Legislature ob-
viously considered that the immunity thus granted was 
sufficient to protect the owner and operator from fraudulent 
claims, we think it improper for this court to extend that 
immunity further in a particular class of cases to claims for 
injuries proximately resulting from the operator's wilful 
misconduct or intoxication. 
[15] Although defendants contend that to allow tort ac-
tions between minor brothers and sistcrs will impair their 
parents' exercise of their disciplinary functions, they fail to 
make clear how that impairment will take place and we see no 
substance in the contention. Similarly, the contention that to 
allow a sister to recover a judgmcnt against her brother will 
result in an uneven distribution of the family resources is 
without merit. [16] A parent is not ord inarily vicariously 
liable for the torts of his minor child (lV eber v. Pinyan, 9 
Ca1.2d 226, 235 [70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407] ; Martin v. 
Barrett, 120 Cal.App.2d 625, 628 [261 P.2d 551]; Ellis v. 
D'Angelo, S1£pra, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 317), and a minor 
child's property is his own and not that of his parents. 
(Estate of Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 649 [206 P. 995] ; Civ. Code, 
§ 202.) [17] Finally, we think that the p:>ssibility of a 
minor defendant's succession by intestacy to the damages 
recovered from him by a minor brother or sister is too remote 
and speculative a basis on which to found the rule of im-
munity for which defendant contends. (See McCurdy, supra, 
43 Harv.L.Rev. 1030, 1073.) Accordingly, we conclude 
that Barbara and Joyce may maintain the present action 
against their minor brother, James. 
In the third cause of action pleaded in the complaint 
Esther, the mother of the minor plaintiffs, attempts to recover 
for the expenses incurred in caring for and treating the 
injuries receiycd. by the minor plaintiffs. [18] Insofar as 
that cause of action is pleaded against her husband, Buel, 
1 
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the pleading is defective since a cause of action for damages 
suffered by the parents because of injury to their minor 
child is community property-(Flores v. Brown, 39 Ca1.2d 
622,630 L248 P.2d 922]) and Bue] 's alleged wilful misconduct 
is imputable to Esther. (Ibid.) [19] Insofar as Esther 
attempts to state a cause of action against her minor son, 
James, the pleading is defective since it fails to comply with 
the requirements of section 376 of the Code of Civil pro-
cedure.· 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., con-
cUl'red. 
